In the waning days of his tenure as Tallahassee city manager, Reese Goad moved one of Mayor John Dailey’s top aides, Dionte Gavin, into a vacant leadership job at the jointly operated city-county Office of Economic Vitality. He did it without consulting Leon County Administrator Vince Long, and with no written authority to do so, according to the agency’s own attorney.[…]
October 20, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
In the waning days of his tenure as Tallahassee city manager, Reese Goad moved one of Mayor John Dailey’s top aides, Dionte Gavin, into a vacant leadership job at the jointly operated city-county Office of Economic Vitality. He did it without consulting Leon County Administrator Vince Long, and with no written authority to do so, according to the agency’s own attorney.
And Long wasn’t happy about it.
Gavin’s transfer into the job of OEV deputy director of Business Vitality and Intelligence set off a remarkable series of emails between Long, city officials and attorneys, obtained by Red Tape Florida through a public records request. In them, the county administrator demands to know who authorized the appointment and why the position was filled without an open, competitive hiring process.
Long believed Goad had disregarded an earlier decision by the Interlocal Management Committee (IMC) to leave the position vacant.
What is the IMC? It has exactly two members: the Tallahassee city manager and the Leon County administrator.
Goad and Long.
In other words, when Long complained that the IMC’s direction had been ignored, he was talking about a decision made by himself and Goad, the very person who subsequently authorized the move.
Long also wanted to know something that should be fairly easy to answer: Who gave Goad the authority to make that decision on his own?
The answer, it turns out, is nobody. At least not in writing.
A pattern of parting gifts?
The Gavin situation is the second example of controversial, end-of-tenure Goad action to surface this week. Based on public records requested and shared by the website Florida Capital Tea and confirmed by Red Tape Florida, City of Tallahassee Communications Director Allison Farris received a whopping 24 percent raise sometime between June 4 and the end of Goad’s tenure, taking her salary to $260,283. It was the second consecutive 24-percent raise for Farris, who saw her pay increase about $92,000 in two years.
Blindsided
Meanwhile, back to the Gavin hiring, the first sign of trouble came on Sept. 30, and it didn’t come from the county.
That evening, Artie White, director of PLACE, the umbrella department that oversees OEV, Blueprint and joint city-county planning, emailed the city’s human resources director. He had been “made aware this morning,” he wrote, of “the transfer of an employee” into the deputy director position.

While the records do not indicate who made White aware, Sept. 30 happened to be Goad’s last day before retirement.
“When hiring staff, the general preference is to elevate the preferred candidate to the City and County for consideration before making an offer,” White wrote. Because it was a transfer of staff, he wanted to verify that it was done “in accordance with” proper HR processes and procedures.
White forwarded his email to county staff, and it reached Long the next morning.
So, the director of the department learned about the move the day it happened. The county learned about it from a forwarded email.
Long starts asking questions
On Oct. 5, Long emailed White and OEV Director Keith Bowers to “clearly communicate my expectations” for what he called the “vacant” position.
“Should this position be filled, I will be holding you directly accountable to ensure that there is a formal competitive selection process conducted to identify the most qualified candidate for the job,” Long wrote.

He outlined the qualifications he believed the job required, including a track record in business recruitment, experience managing state and local incentive programs and the ability to supervise data-driven teams.
He also emphasized “transparency, public trust, and professionalism,” and drew a line: “Regardless of any apparent prior misinterpretation or misapplication of City policy, let me assure you that no decision to fill a position at Blueprint will be made unilaterally.”
White’s answer, two days later: He couldn’t do it.
City Human Resources, he wrote, had informed him “that the position is not vacant and therefore cannot be advertised as such.” The city’s HR director had confirmed that “City Policies and Procedures were properly followed.”
The position Long wanted filled through an open search had already been filled without one.

Gavin, for his part, had already announced it. At 4:39 p.m. on Oct. 7, one minute before White’s email telling Long the job was “not vacant,” Gavin posted on Facebook that he was “excited to begin a new chapter” at OEV and had been “overwhelmed by the incredibly warm welcome.”
Not from everyone.
Long followed up the same day with two pointed questions. First, he asked White to confirm that neither White nor Bowers “conducted a process or made the hiring recommendation/decision.”
Second: “My clear recollection is that both members of the IMC agreed and provided the explicit standing direction to Keith not to fill the position (the reason the position has remained vacant and the process to fill was suspended). Please confirm.”
The city’s explanation
Assistant City Manager Wayne Tedder responded on Oct. 8.
“There was no direction from the City to freeze the position,” Tedder wrote. “The City, however, agreed to not fill the position at the time it was last advertised.”
Tedder said Blueprint and OEV have followed the city’s HR policies since Blueprint’s inception, and he pointed the finger back at the county. “There were earlier attempts to create a separate Blueprint/OEV HR policy, but the County declined to make any changes,” he wrote.
Then he described how the job was filled.
Tedder wrote that he had asked White and Bowers “to identify vacant positions within OEV,” and then “to convey information describing the Deputy Director position to Dionte and answer any questions regarding the roles of the position.”
“The next step,” he wrote, “was initiated by the City Manager through the City’s HR process and concluded with final approval by the City Manager.”

That explanation confirmed the city’s role in making the appointment. It also made clear that the job was pitched to one person.
It did not settle Long’s central question: Did the city’s responsibility for administering personnel procedures give its manager the authority to make hiring decisions for a jointly governed agency without the county’s involvement?
Long wasn’t buying it.
A question for the lawyers
On Oct. 9, Long took his concerns directly to Blueprint attorney Susan Dawson.
He wrote that the appointment “was unexpected in the unilateral and uncoordinated manner in which it was made and entirely inconsistent with the established framework and intent of this jointly managed function,” and that it “contradicted the previous explicit and standing direction of the IMC not to fill the position.”
He asked Dawson a broader question: What authority does either the county administrator or the city manager have to act unilaterally on Planning, OEV or Blueprint? He asked her to cite the interlocal agreement or any other governing document that supports it.
Dawson said she would respond in writing by early the following week.
Long had his own lawyer in the loop, too. He blind-copied County Attorney Chasity O’Steen on nearly every email in the exchange, and on Oct. 9 she sent him a document titled “Summary of Provisions and Outstanding Questions.”
No express authority
By Oct. 14, the disagreement had reached Goad’s successor, City Manager Karen Jumonville.
Following up on a conversation the two had the previous week, Long wrote that the appointment was “entirely inconsistent with the established framework and intent of this jointly managed function” and “directly contradicted the explicit, standing direction” of the IMC to leave the position vacant.

He proposed having Dawson draft amendments to the interlocal agreement to clarify “the recruitment, hiring, and supervision of Blueprint employees,” so there would be “no future misinterpretations or avoidable misunderstandings.”
“This email constitutes my formal direction to Artie to proceed,” Long wrote.
Jumonville replied that afternoon. “I agree with your recommendation below and look forward to reviewing the draft language.”
Minutes earlier, Dawson had answered Long’s broader question.
She identified only two circumstances in which either member of the IMC can act alone: removing an item from the agenda, as long as a board member didn’t request it, and firing the director of PLACE.
Beyond that, she wrote, the interlocal agreement and its two addenda do “not explicitly provide for either the County Administrator or the City Manager to take unilateral action regarding the operation of Blueprint or OEV.”
Dawson also explained the arrangement at the root of the dispute. Blueprint has no HR policy of its own. In 2002, its board voted to operate under the city’s administrative code for personnel matters, and Blueprint pays the city for HR services. In fiscal year 2026, that came to $15,648 for OEV alone.
Long asked for the specific city HR policy that allowed the city manager to hire at Blueprint. When Dawson sent it, he still didn’t see it.
On Oct. 15, he pointed to the record. The 2002 board vote, which he said he recalled from his own involvement at the time, was amended to narrow the city’s role to its “administrative code to include holidays, training, travel, security etc.” And the 2017 addendum to the interlocal agreement says Blueprint employees may choose to be city or county employees “only for the purposes of employment benefits administration.”
He asked Dawson for a formal legal opinion on the city manager’s authority, “citing the specific provisions from our governing documents.”
Dawson’s reply was direct.
“The City’s HR Policy does not specifically address the City Manager’s unilateral authority to take employment action for a Blueprint employee,” she wrote. “Blueprint policies and governing documents do not address this matter and are silent on this issue.”
Her explanation of the city’s position: “I think that because Blueprint has followed the City’s HR Policy since inception and pays for HR services, the City has interpreted that relationship as allowing a transfer of personnel under their HR Policy.”
That was enough for Long.
“I appreciate your confirmation that there was/is currently no express authority for this employment action,” he wrote back. Based on her answers and “a plain reading of the Interlocal,” he said, he no longer needed a formal legal opinion.
Dawson asked how he wanted to fix it: a third addendum to the interlocal agreement, which would require approval from both the City and County commissions, or a Blueprint HR policy, which would need only the Blueprint board’s approval. Long suggested an HR policy approved by the board.

The county administrator had effectively forced a discussion about whether the city’s longstanding personnel practices had outrun the authority granted by the agencies’ governing agreements.
Who’s running OEV?
The dispute comes at an awkward time for an economic development agency already facing questions about its effectiveness in attracting businesses and creating jobs.
OEV is supposed to be a partnership between Tallahassee and Leon County, with shared oversight and accountability.
Yet the correspondence shows that the two governments could not agree on who had the authority to fill a senior management position.
The emails do not establish that the appointment was illegal or that Gavin lacks the qualifications for the job. They do establish that the county administrator objected to the process, that the agency’s own attorney found no written authority for it, and that the two governments are now rewriting the rules to prevent a repeat.
For Goad, the appointment was among the personnel decisions made near the end of his tenure as city manager.
The appointment also involves two figures with ties to Leadership Tallahassee, a program of the Greater Tallahassee Chamber of Commerce. Gavin serves on the organization’s Board of Governors, while Goad received its 2026 Servant Leadership Award on September 16 — just two weeks before his retirement and approval of Gavin’s transfer.
Gavin came to the mayor’s office in 2023 after serving as senior operations director for Visit Tallahassee, where his responsibilities included budgeting, finance, procurement and administration. Before that, he spent nearly 18 years with the Leon County Clerk of Court and Comptroller, eventually becoming financial services manager. He holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Florida State University. While Gavin has extensive experience in local government administration, his publicly documented work history shows no direct experience in business recruitment or economic development.
Meanwhile, for taxpayers funding the Office of Economic Vitality, the situation raises a fairly obvious question.
If the city and county can’t agree on who’s allowed to hire the people running economic development, who’s accountable for the results?
October 20, 2026
For years, Tallahassee officials have promised big things from a new International Processing Facility and Foreign-Trade Zone at Tallahassee International Airport.[…]
October 15, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
For years, Tallahassee officials have promised big things from a new International Processing Facility and Foreign-Trade Zone at Tallahassee International Airport.
Really big things.
More than 1,600 jobs.
More than $300 million in annual economic impact.
Hundreds of acres opened for development.
A “global gateway” connecting Tallahassee to international markets.
Mayor John Dailey called the City’s 2022 move toward establishing a Foreign-Trade Zone “a huge step forward.”
Four years later, the step apparently wasn’t quite as large as advertised. It’s yet another example of The Capital City of Things That Never Happen that has been a hallmark of Dailey’s regime.
The International Processing Facility that was once supposed to be completed in 2024 still isn’t operational.
The project, originally awarded for $23.5 million plus contingency, is now described by the City as a $35 million investment.
And the federal application required to actually establish Tallahassee’s much-touted Foreign-Trade Zone?
It hasn’t been submitted.
That last part came as something of a surprise to Red Tape Florida.
It may come as an even bigger surprise to Leon County.
About that application
RTF recently asked the City for the formal application submitted to the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Board, including the submission date and any federal docket or application number.
“No responsive record exists,” the City replied.
We asked for correspondence between the City, airport and federal FTZ Board concerning the application or its status since 2022.
“No responsive record exists.”
So we asked directly about an apparent discrepancy between City and County documents: Has the application actually been submitted?
“The formal application is being assembled but has not yet been submitted,” the City responded.
Fair enough.
Except that’s not what Leon County has been telling county commissioners — or the public.
In October 2023, County agenda materials accurately described what was supposed to happen next: “Once complete, the City will submit its formal application to the Foreign-Trade Zone Board for approval.”
Somewhere between then and May 2024, however, the County’s version of events changed.
“The City’s formal application was subsequently submitted to the Foreign-Trade Zone Board and is now pending approval,” County agenda materials stated in May 2024.
The County repeated essentially the same claim in June 2024.
As recently as June 9 of this year, County Administrator Vincent Long’s legislative-session report told commissioners that the City “has submitted its formal application to the Foreign-Trade Zone Board.”
It hadn’t.
The City says it still hasn’t.
Apparently Tallahassee and Leon County have spent the past couple of years operating in slightly different foreign-trade zones.
The other delay
So why hasn’t Tallahassee applied?
Back in 2021, Aviation Director David Pollard publicly explained the planned sequence:
“First we build the facility that will house Customs, and once we get Customs in, we make a formal application for the Foreign Trade Zone.”
There’s just one problem with that plan.
They’re still building the facility.
City documents once said the International Processing Facility was slated for completion in the third quarter of 2024.
That became the third quarter of 2025. Then “opening in 2025.”
In March 2025, with construction reportedly 80% complete, officials said it would be finished by the end of that year.
By October, Pollard said substantial completion would occur in early 2026, after which U.S. Customs and Border Protection would still need to install equipment, systems and furniture.
The City’s current materials say the facility will become operational in 2026.
So a facility once expected to be finished in 2024 is still awaiting completion in late 2026.
And because Customs isn’t in, the City’s own stated sequence means the FTZ application hasn’t gone in either.
One delay has effectively become two.
Then there’s the money
In December 2021, the City awarded Whitesell-Green Inc. a $23.476 million contract to build the facility, with a 5% contingency bringing the authorized amount to about $24.6 million.
The project is being funded through a mixture of federal and state grants, airport money and local penny-sales-tax dollars.
In January 2024, the City Commission approved another $878,674 for the project and authorized City Manager Reese Goad or his designee to execute the necessary change orders.
Today, the City describes the International Processing Facility as a $35 million project.
That doesn’t necessarily mean Tallahassee has experienced a $10 million cost overrun. The scope and components included in those various figures may be different.
But we’d certainly like to know.
We’d also like to know why a facility originally expected to be completed in 2024 still isn’t open nearly two years later.
So we’re asking.
Another public-records request
RTF is submitting a narrowly tailored public-records request for approved change orders, contract amendments and time-extension requests involving the construction contract that changed the project’s completion date or document delays.
Those records should tell us whether the delays resulted from design changes, federal requirements, construction problems, expanded scope, supply issues or something else entirely — and what those changes cost.
Maybe there’s a perfectly reasonable explanation.
There often is.
But after years of $300 million economic-impact projections, 1,600-job promises, shifting completion dates and Leon County repeatedly announcing the submission of a federal application that apparently never left Tallahassee, we figure it’s worth asking.
After all, before Tallahassee can become a global gateway, it would probably help if City Hall and the County Courthouse were in the same time zone.
October 15, 2026
Three construction estimates are supposed to give taxpayers some confidence they’re getting a competitive price.[…]
October 9, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
Three construction estimates are supposed to give taxpayers some confidence they’re getting a competitive price.
The application for a $200,000 Tallahassee Community Redevelopment Agency grant at 540 W. Brevard Street has two bids listed on the application.
The space for Bid Three is blank.
But deeper in the supporting documents, there is a third estimate.
And that’s where this gets interesting.
One of the first two bids came from the company that owns the building.
The other came from a company where the building owner’s president works.
And that third estimate?
Somebody apparently had a calculator.

The project
The CRA is considering a $200,000 grant to help Unity Child Care Development Schools convert the former retail building at 540 W. Brevard Street into a private K-8 school.
The building is owned by Ballew Properties LLC, which bought the property for $550,000 in March 2025.
The renovation is expected to cost more than $600,000, with taxpayers picking up $200,000 of the tab.
Now, about those estimates.
Bid No. 1: The landlord
The lowest estimate — $604,485.18 — came from Ballew Properties itself.
In other words, the company that owns the building also submitted the low bid to perform the improvements to its own property.

Bid No. 2: Not exactly a stranger
The other bid listed on the application — $631,334.44 — came from Munyan, a Largo-based painting, roofing and restoration company.
At least that one came from somebody else.
Well, not really.
Asher Ballew, president of Ballew Properties, is identified on Munyan’s own website as a sales/project manager for the company.
Florida corporate records also list Ballew as a vice president of Munyan Residential Painting Services LLC, an affiliated Munyan business operating from the same 7325 Ulmerton Road headquarters in Largo.
The Munyan proposal in the CRA packet uses that same 7325 Ulmerton Road address.
And there’s another problem with it.
The proposal is dated May 29, 2026, and says it remains valid for only 10 calendar days.
That put its expiration in early June.
Unity’s application is dated Aug. 18 — more than two months later.
And then there’s Bid No. 3
Remember that blank space on the application?
The supporting documents include another estimate, this one for $617,909.81.
That’s between the Ballew and Munyan numbers.
Actually, it’s exactly between them.
Ballew Properties: $604,485.18.
Munyan: $631,334.44.
Average: $617,909.81.
And there’s no need to take Red Tape Florida’s word for it.
The document says it itself:
“Pricing basis: midpoint of supplied project totals $604,485.18 and $631,334.44 = $617,909.81.”

So, the third estimate wasn’t independently priced. Its total was calculated by averaging the first two.

But keep reading.
The document says the pricing was “based on the two supplied project bids and assembled for Boothe Construction review.”
It says the scope, quantities, pricing, terms, payment schedule, exclusions, schedule and acceptance were still “subject to Boothe Construction review and approval before issuance.”
And at the bottom:
“Prepared for Boothe Construction review; not issued until approved and authorized by Boothe Construction.”
In other words, the third estimate in the supporting documents wasn’t just derived from the first two.
The document itself indicates that it had not yet been approved and authorized for issuance by Boothe Construction.
So, you might be asking, it’s not possible that there is a connection between Ballew and Boothe, is there?
Well, Red Tape Florida couldn’t find one until we went to the Boothe web site and saw this client testimonial.

We have a call into Boothe to see if “Asher B.” is, indeed, Asher Ballew.
CRA requirements
The CRA’s Commercial Property Improvement Program checklist calls for applicants to submit “three (3) quotes from licensed contractors including itemization of all proposed improvements.”
Interestingly, on Unity’s application checklist, that requirement is not checked off — while numerous requirements immediately above and below it are.

Nevertheless, CRA staff is recommending approval of the full $200,000 grant.
What the heck is the CRA doing?
How did this application get a recommendation for approval in the first place?
Red Tape Florida found all of this through a basic review of the documents the CRA itself provided and a few simple searches of public records.
The application lists only two bids. Bid Three is blank.
The CRA’s own checklist calls for three quotes from licensed contractors. That box isn’t checked.
One bid came from the company that owns the property.
The other came from a company where the property owner’s president works. That proposal had also expired more than two months before the application was submitted.
And the document apparently being used as the third estimate says right on it that the price was calculated from the first two bids and that it had not yet been approved and authorized for issuance by the contractor whose name appears on it.
None of this was particularly difficult to find.
Yet CRA staff reviewed this application and is recommending that taxpayers put $200,000 into the project.
And let’s remember who’s running this operation.
Just six weeks ago, the CRA board approved a $45,707 raise for Executive Director Stephen Cox, bringing his annual salary to $165,000. Mayor John Dailey defended the increase, saying Cox’s position was “woefully underfunded.”
For that kind of money, taxpayers ought to expect something more than a rubber stamp on a $200,000 grant application.
So, what exactly did that review involve?
Did anyone ask why the property owner was bidding on improvements to its own building?
Did anyone check the relationship between the property owner and the second bidder?
Did anyone notice that bid had expired?
Did anyone ask why there was no third bid listed on the application?
Did anyone contact Boothe Construction to determine whether it had actually approved and authorized the document bearing its name?
And, perhaps most importantly, did anyone at the CRA determine whether these documents actually satisfy the program’s requirement for three quotes from licensed contractors?
Because if Red Tape Florida could uncover all of this with the CRA’s own documents and a few basic public-record searches, it’s fair to ask: Why didn’t the people recommending spending $200,000 of taxpayer money do the same thing?
October 9, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
There is nothing quite like that new-car smell.
Former Tallahassee City Manager Reese Goad apparently got to enjoy it with remarkable frequency.
Records obtained by Red Tape Florida show the City bought or traded for five new Ford F-150 pickup trucks for Goad in just over seven years — model years 2019, 2021, 2023, 2025 and 2026.
Five trucks. Seven years. During tough budget times. Now the City’s random insistence that Red Tape Florida pay $480 for the records makes more sense.
After spending $49,701.72 on the first Goad truck in 2019, taxpayers kicked in another $60,328.48 to keep trading relatively new trucks for newer ones. Total documented cash outlay on the five transactions: $110,030.20.
The City’s detailed fleet policy required ordinary vehicle-replacement decisions to consider things like mileage, useful life, condition and maintenance history.
Goad’s vehicle was exempt.
His employment contract instead promised him “regular replacement” of a City-provided automobile. “Regular” has apparently been doing some heavy lifting.
And then there’s Truck No. 5.

On April 6, 2026, Fleet Management requested a purchase order to trade Goad’s 2025 F-150 for a brand-new 2026 King Ranch 4×4. While it’s not as pricy as the nearly $100,000 vehicle the City purchased for Tallahassee Police Chief Lawrence Revell, the City still paid another $11,538.89, after trading in the 2025 model for $57,000. The paperwork said the new truck was expected to be built or delivered in two weeks, which would be around April 20.
Just 8 days after the estimated delivery date – on April 28 — Goad announced his retirement.
The spending is particularly striking given the financial message coming from City Hall. Tallahassee has been raising fees and searching for savings, including paying nearly $3.9 million this year to persuade 171 employees to leave — a buyout program officials claimed would save about $8.46 million annually (but haven’t been able to show their math).
The City has repeatedly described those and other measures as part of an effort to control costs and prepare for looming budget pressures. Apparently, austerity did not extend to the City Manager’s pickup trucks.
A new truck every couple of years
The cycle started in March 2019, when the City purchased a Ford F-150 for Goad’s use for $49,701.72.
In October 2021, the City traded it for another F-150. The dealer allowed $41,000 for the old truck, leaving taxpayers to kick in another $10,397.
Less than two years later, Goad did it again.
In September 2023, the City received $44,000 for Goad’s 2021 truck and paid another $15,449.84 to put him in a new one.
That one didn’t make it nearly as long.
In January 2025 – just 16 months later — the City traded it for a new F-150 King Ranch, one of Ford’s upscale trim levels. The City received $46,500 for the 2023 truck and paid another $22,942.75.
Surely that would hold him for a while, especially given what we now know … that retirement was looming.
It did not.

About 14 months later, the City traded the 2025 King Ranch for a 2026 King Ranch. The trade brought $57,000, and taxpayers paid another $11,538.89.
Add up those four upgrade checks and you get $60,328.48 — on top of the nearly $50,000 taxpayers spent to put Goad in the first truck.
Depreciation? Never heard of her
There is a reason financially prudent people tend not to buy a brand-new vehicle every couple years.
Depreciation.
New vehicles generally lose value fastest during their early years. There is an old saying about how a car loses thousands of dollars in value the minute it is driven off the lot.
Trading a relatively new vehicle doesn’t make that depreciation disappear. The dealer simply tells you what the used vehicle is now worth, applies that amount to the next new vehicle and somebody pays the difference.
In this case, that somebody was repeatedly the taxpayer.
To be clear, the City received substantial value for each trade-in. This isn’t $110,030 disappearing into thin air.
But the relevant comparison is between repeatedly trading Goad’s functioning, relatively new trucks and simply continuing to drive them.
Each time the City chose the former, taxpayers paid again.
$10,397.
$15,449.84.
$22,942.75.
$11,538.89.
It’s an interesting approach to vehicle depreciation: experience as much of the early part of it as possible.
For perspective, nearly two-thirds of Americans keep their vehicles at least five years, according to an April 2026 Cox Automotive study.
Apparently, they haven’t discovered Tallahassee’s vehicle replacement program.
The rules … for everybody else
And then there is Tallahassee’s Fleet Management Policy.
It is 10 pages long and contains detailed rules designed to manage City vehicles efficiently. For ordinary City vehicles, Fleet Management and the department are supposed to evaluate mileage, life expectancy, general condition and maintenance history in determining whether a vehicle should be replaced.
The City even requires a five-year vehicle replacement plan.
Sounds prudent.
Then you get to Page 10.
“Vehicles assigned to appointed officials are exempt from this policy.” Commission Policy 124
Goad was an appointed official.
So, the City had specific standards designed to determine when ordinary taxpayer-owned vehicles had reached the point where replacement made financial sense.
The City Manager’s truck wasn’t subject to them.
And remember who sat at the top of the fleet-management system. The policy gives the City Manager responsibility for approving fleet administrative guidelines and vehicle utilization rates.
Mileage, useful life, condition and maintenance history for everybody else. For the boss: “regular replacement.” Goad wasn’t operating without any rules. Appointed officials are instead subject to the City’s purchasing requirements.
Those are reassuring, too.
The City’s procurement policy says one of its objectives is obtaining acceptable-quality goods and services “at the right time and price.”
It’s difficult to argue with that.
Buying things at the wrong time and price would be a considerably less promising procurement strategy.
Where are the guardrails?
The same City purchasing policy gives the City Manager authority to approve transactions up to $250,000. Taken together, the City’s policies and Goad’s employment agreement appear to have created a remarkably closed loop.
Goad was entitled to a City-provided automobile. His contract required taxpayers to pay for its purchase, operation, maintenance, repair and “regular replacement.”
How expensive could the vehicle be?
His contract doesn’t say.
How often could it be replaced?
It doesn’t say.
How many miles did it have to accumulate first?
It doesn’t say.
Did it have to be worn out, unreliable or expensive to maintain?
It doesn’t say.
Ordinarily, those are exactly the kinds of questions Tallahassee’s Fleet Management Policy requires the City to consider before replacing a taxpayer-owned vehicle.
But vehicles assigned to appointed officials are specifically exempt from that policy.
And Goad wasn’t merely an appointed official receiving a City vehicle. He was the City Manager — the official the City’s policies put at the top of the administrative and purchasing structure.
His purchasing authority extended to $250,000.
So far, Red Tape Florida has found no separate vehicle-price limit, replacement schedule, mileage requirement or condition standard that applied to Goad’s truck.
That’s the remarkable part of this story.
The City Commission promised its City Manager a vehicle with “regular replacement,” but apparently put no definition around either the vehicle or the replacement.
Goad plainly was entitled to a City vehicle. And we have found no evidence that any of these purchases violated his employment agreement.
The question is whether the system itself contained enough guardrails to protect the people paying the bills.
Because when one city manager can go through five new trucks in seven years without apparently violating a rule, the question isn’t just why he kept getting new trucks.
It’s why the rules allowed it.
And where is Truck No. 5?
There’s one loose end.
Goad retired only months after the City paid another $11,538.89 to move him from the 2025 King Ranch into a 2026 King Ranch.
His employment agreement gave him unrestricted use of a City automobile while he was employed. It did not give him ownership of one. Unlike Tallahassee Police Chief Lawrence Revell’s contract, which includes a provision for buying back a vehicle upon leaving the City, Goad’s did not include such language.
So Red Tape Florida has asked the City what happened to the newest truck after Goad left.
Did it remain in the City fleet?
Was it reassigned?
Was it sold?
Did Goad purchase it?
And if he did, how much did he pay and how was that price determined?
After five new trucks in seven years, it seems reasonable for taxpayers to know where the last one parked.
October 6, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
What does the Office of Economic Vitality actually spend all that money on?
It’s a question Red Tape Florida has heard repeatedly from local residents as we’ve reported on OEV’s staffing, business-recruitment record and the millions of dollars flowing through the agency.
So we decided to find out.
OEV’s adopted fiscal-year 2026 budget totals about $9.15 million, although most of that isn’t day-to-day agency spending. The budget includes roughly $3.92 million transferred to capital projects, $2.43 million for debt service and $1.92 million for personnel. Another $436,000 is budgeted in the category labeled “Operating Expenses,” with additional amounts for other services, capital outlay and administrative costs.
But budget documents tell you how money is supposed to be spent. Red Tape Florida wanted to see the checkbook.
RTF obtained OEV’s detailed accounts-payable records for the current fiscal year. The records include invoices dated through July 31 — two months before the end of the fiscal year — and show $812,550.91 in actual payments to companies, consultants, vendors and incentive recipients.
Nearly half of that total — $381,239 — is incentive payments still being made on Amazon’s 2021 fulfillment-center deal. The remaining records provide a much more granular look at what OEV is buying: consultants, studies, databases, marketing, advertising, sponsorships and other economic-development services.
And after looking through the spending, another question naturally follows:
Where are the new wins?
Still Paying Amazon
The largest chunk of the money — $381,239 — is incentive payments associated with Amazon’s massive fulfillment center near Mahan Drive.
That project was announced in 2021.
Local officials approved a $2.565 million incentive package for what was then called Project Mango, with payments spread over six years through reimbursement of eligible development fees and certain property taxes.
Amazon delivered on the promises attached to the deal. By March 2024, Leon County reported the company had invested approximately $250 million in the facility and employed about 1,400 people, exceeding the original requirement of 1,000 jobs.
OEV counts Amazon as one of its biggest economic-development successes and received a Florida Economic Development Council award for the project.
RTF has previously reported another side of the deal.
Multiple sources familiar with the Amazon project have told RTF that the company had already decided to locate the facility in Leon County before the incentive package was approved.
Whatever your view of the original incentive deal, the current records establish something else:
Five years after Amazon was announced, taxpayers are still paying the incentives.
And the $381,239 in Amazon payments accounts for nearly half of the $812,550 in direct payments reviewed by RTF.
Consultants, Data and Marketing
The rest of the spreadsheet provides a window into the day-to-day machinery of economic development.
OEV paid SB Friedman Development Advisors $67,933 for a “Targeted Industry Study Analysis.”
Another $29,999 went to Placer Labs for platform access and ESRI basemaps.
Wall Street Transcript Corp. received $28,000, including $20,000 described in OEV’s records as “2026 MDSM Conference – Carpet” and another $8,000 for an event sponsorship.
GIS WebTech received $25,182 for licenses and renewals. Grova Creative received $24,500 for a website audit/review and Market District marketing. Bludot Technologies received $21,520 for a business database.
Other payments include nearly $18,000 to CoStar, almost $14,000 to InfoUSA, $13,400 to the publisher of Area Development, $11,000 for airport LED advertising and $10,000 to Choose Tallahassee.
There is nothing inherently unusual about an economic-development agency spending money on research, data and marketing. Companies looking to expand need site information. Site selectors need data. Communities market themselves. Consultants conduct studies.
And recruiting a company can take years.
But those expenditures also provide a useful measuring stick for taxpayers: What is all that activity producing?
OEV’s own July economic dashboard doesn’t provide a particularly rosy snapshot. Leon County employment was down 1 percent from a year earlier, unemployment was up 0.8 percentage points and taxable sales were down 15.5 percent year over year.
Another stat: It has been two years — at least — since OEV has announced a single significant economic development win.
Lucy, Charlie Brown and Project Vertigo
That’s not to say there haven’t been prospects. Last fall came Project Vertigo.
The confidential British company was considering Tallahassee for a 216,000-square-foot manufacturing facility and 50,000-square-foot office building at the airport. The potential prize was enormous: more than 2,000 jobs.
The company was expected to make its site decision by the end of 2025.
That was nearly a year ago.
No Vertigo announcement followed.
There was also Project E-Boat, another prospect RTF previously tracked that held out the possibility of more than 500 jobs.
Again, no announced Tallahassee deal.
At some point, the succession of big prospects begins to resemble Lucy holding the football for Charlie Brown.
There’s always reason to believe the big economic-development kick may finally be coming. But the community is still waiting for contact with the ball.
Confidential prospects disappear all the time, of course. Tallahassee competes against other communities, and losing a recruitment prospect doesn’t necessarily mean OEV did anything wrong.
But taxpayers aren’t funding prospects.
They’re funding an economic-development organization to produce results.
Meanwhile, in the OEV Newsletter…
You might not detect the shortage of recruitment announcements from reading OEV’s newsletters.
OEV publishes one roughly every two weeks, and there has been no shortage of material in 2026.

Since March, readers have learned about a Domi Awards celebration, the Leon Works Expo, educational attainment, Small Business Week, hurricane preparedness, the Love Your Local campaign, high-speed internet in rural Leon County, the Kidpreneur program and Tallahassee Restaurant Week.
One May newsletter celebrated an OEV employee’s 30 years of public service.
July brought “Kidpreneurs Launch Their Entrepreneurial Journey.” Two weeks later came an invitation to the Kidpreneur Pop-up Market.
August brought the news that 18 Tallahassee employers made Florida Trend’s Best Companies to Work For list — recognition earned by those companies, not companies recruited here by OEV.
And on Aug. 24, OEV announced that its own podcast, Economic Vitality Unplugged, had won an international Silver Award for economic-development storytelling. OEV says the award recognizes the podcast for making economic development “accessible, engaging, and community-centered.”
There is nothing wrong with promoting local businesses, recognizing employees, helping young entrepreneurs or producing a podcast.
But it’s a striking contrast.
OEV’s newsletter archive documents an extraordinary amount of economic-development activity.
What’s considerably harder to find is a new company announcing: We’re coming to Tallahassee.
OEV did travel to England this summer for the Farnborough International Airshow, where it says it connected with global manufacturers, suppliers and executives considering future expansion. OEV called participation a “strategic investment in long-term business recruitment.”
Perhaps one of those conversations will become the next Amazon.
For now, it remains another investment in a future result.
What did $24,000 Buy?
One smaller expenditure caught RTF’s attention.
OEV paid Strategic Optimization and Research LLC, or SOAR, $24,000 for what the accounts-payable records describe as “OEV Training Academy Facilitation.”
RTF initially couldn’t find evidence that an OEV Training Academy had actually taken place. So we filed another public-records request asking for the contract, invoice, scope of work and whatever taxpayers received for the $24,000.
Turns out, the work did happen.
But it wasn’t a training academy.
SOAR conducted four focus groups involving OEV-certified businesses, prime contractors and government project managers and produced a report recommending nine courses for a Small Business Training Academy OEV hopes to launch in 2027.
The proposed courses include project management, estimating and bid pricing, financial management, procurement, artificial intelligence, leadership, basic Microsoft Office and productivity tools, construction basics and joint ventures.
The $24,000 did not buy finished courses. There are no completed lesson plans, instructor materials or student materials in the final product. SOAR describes what it produced as an “implementation-ready framework” containing course concepts, topics, suggested delivery methods and possible measures of success.
But one recommendation in the report jumped out.
Before launching the academy, SOAR says OEV should review training already available locally through organizations including the Chamber, Small Business Development Center, FAMU, Tallahassee State College, FSU and the Jim Moran Institute.
The reason is “to confirm that taxpayer-funded programming is not duplicating existing offerings.”
That’s a sensible thing to do.
The question is why it wasn’t done first.
OEV spent $24,000 identifying the classes local businesses might need before determining whether those classes were already available.
The academy could ultimately fill legitimate gaps and prove valuable. But taxpayers will have to wait to find out what additional work — and additional money — will be required to turn the recommendations into actual courses.
Activity vs. Results
Taken individually, most of the payments in OEV’s spreadsheet aren’t particularly remarkable.
Taken together, they provide a revealing snapshot.
To be fair, economic development isn’t a vending machine where taxpayers insert $812,000 and a factory drops out.
But OEV’s own description of itself says the agency exists in part to provide “accountability” and “transparency” in economic development and to help companies relocate and expand here.
That makes the distinction between activity and results a fair one.
Amazon is real. It opened. It created jobs.
And five years later, taxpayers are still paying incentives on that deal while waiting for the next major recruitment success.
Project Vertigo could have been it. Project E-Boat could have been it. Perhaps the contacts made at Farnborough will produce it.
But eventually Charlie Brown gets to ask when he’s actually going to kick the football.
September 23, 2026
The Tallahassee City Commission Wednesday will consider a five-year, $317,000-a-year base salary as a part of the contract for incoming City Manager Karen Jumonville. That’s about $13,000 higher than her predecessor Reese Goad, who spent 10 years as city manager and 27 years with the city.[…]
September 8, 2026
New Tallahassee City Manager will be paid $317k base salary
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
The Tallahassee City Commission Wednesday will consider a five-year, $317,000-a-year base salary as a part of the contract for incoming City Manager Karen Jumonville. That’s about $13,000 higher than her predecessor Reese Goad, who spent 10 years as city manager and 27 years with the city.
Also, tucked into the proposed agreement is a significant new protection for Tallahassee’s top administrator: Jumonville could only be removed by a two-thirds vote of the City Commission.
On Tallahassee’s five-member Commission, that means four votes.
Do the math: Three commissioners can approve Jumonville’s contract Wednesday. Once she’s in the job, those same three commissioners couldn’t fire her.
Outgoing City Manager Reese Goad doesn’t have that protection, according to a City Commission source. Goad can be removed by a simple majority.
The City acknowledges the new provision in Wednesday’s agenda item, but doesn’t compare it to Goad’s contract. Instead, it notes that the two-thirds requirement is the same protection provided to the City’s Inspector General.
That’s an interesting comparison.
The Inspector General is, by design, an independent watchdog. The city manager is the administrative head of city government who reports directly to the City Commission, supervises City operations and employees, oversees public safety, administers the budget and carries out the policies and direction of the Commission. That’s how the City itself describes the job.
Jumonville was selected last week following a nationwide search that attracted 37 applicants from nine states and Washington, D.C., including 13 current or former city and county managers. The Commission ultimately chose its own deputy city manager, who previously served as assistant city manager and Growth Management director.
Now commissioners are being asked to give her an initial five-year contract running through September 2031. At the proposed $317,000 starting salary, that’s $1.585 million in base salary if she serves the entire initial term — before any raises or additional benefits. The agreement automatically renews for another two years unless either side gives six months’ notice, with additional two-year automatic renewals after that.
The proposed agreement gives Jumonville a $1,000-a-month automobile allowance, increasing by $50 each year, along with the maximum allowable annual City contribution to a 457 deferred-compensation account.
If four commissioners do eventually vote to terminate her for convenience, taxpayers would not owe the balance of the five-year contract. Jumonville would instead be entitled to 20 weeks of salary and benefits, along with two months’ notice or pay and benefits in lieu of some or all of that notice period.
Jumonville may turn out to be a terrific city manager. That’s not the issue.
The question for commissioners Wednesday is much simpler:
Why should this City Commission be able to hire Tallahassee’s city manager with three votes — while making a future City Commission find four votes to fire her?
September 8, 2026
Two years ago, when Tallahassee wanted to make its Inspector General harder to fire, City officials said the requirement for a supermajority had to be placed in the City Charter and “could not be done in ordinance.”[…]
September 9, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
Two years ago, when Tallahassee wanted to make its Inspector General harder to fire, City officials said the requirement for a supermajority had to be placed in the City Charter and “could not be done in ordinance.”
So, it went in the Charter amendment.
And Tallahassee voters approved it.
Now City Hall wants to require the same four votes to remove recently hired City Manager Karen Jumonville — not through a Charter amendment, and not even through an ordinance.
Apparently, an employment contract will do. And it’s happening today, Sept. 8, with about 24 hours’ notice for the public.
There’s an old legal maxim that seems particularly appropriate here: Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
For those of us who skipped Latin, it roughly means: The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
It’s a principle that essentially says: If a governing document specifically imposes a requirement in one place but leaves it out somewhere else, there’s a pretty good reason to wonder whether the difference was intentional.
And Tallahassee has given us an unusually convenient case study.
At the April 24, 2024, City Commission meeting, Inspector General Dennis Sutton explained that a proposed Charter amendment would replace the IG’s status of “serving at the will of the commission” with specific protections governing his removal.
Then Sutton explained where the most significant protection had to reside:
“The most significant would have to be in charter and could not be done in ordinance.”
Got that?
An ordinance wasn’t enough.
So, the City went to the trouble of changing its Charter and asking Tallahassee voters to approve it. They did and it now resides in Section 32 of the Charter: “The inspector general may only be removed upon the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of the city commission.”
Now let’s check what those same governing documents say about the city manager.
Section 24 of the Charter says the city manager “shall hold office at the pleasure of the city commission.”
City Code §2-61, which is literally titled “Removal and suspension of city manager,” says:
“The city manager shall be removable by the city commission.”
That’s it.
No two-thirds requirement. No supermajority. No four votes.
But Jumonville’s proposed employment contract says she “may only be removed upon the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of the City Commission.”
And here’s where City Hall really steps on the rake.
The City’s own agenda item invokes the Inspector General as precedent, describing Jumonville’s proposed provision as “the same as the City’s Inspector General’s employment terms.”
Well, not quite.
The Inspector General’s four-vote protection isn’t simply an “employment term.” It’s in the City Charter. Tallahassee voters put it there.
Which leaves City Hall with a question that shouldn’t require much Latin:
If an ordinance wasn’t enough to create four-vote protection for the Inspector General, how is an employment contract enough to create it for the city manager?
And then, of course, there’s the politics.
Despite multiple political operatives telling Red Tape Florida that Mayor John Dailey’s favorability ratings have cratered, the mayor and the current commission majority are racing to beat the calendar before an election that could change the balance of power at City Hall.
We’ve seen this movie a few times lately: the attempted Phipps annexation, the bungled TMH-FSU deal and the decision to hire a permanent city manager rather than leave that decision to the commission that will govern after the election.
Some of those efforts didn’t make it across the finish line. The city manager hire did.
Jumonville was selected 3-2. Now those same three commissioners can approve a contract ensuring that a future three-commissioner majority can’t undo their choice.
That’s quite a trick.
None of this, standing alone, proves the contract provision is illegal. But the legal question and the political question have landed in pretty much the same place.
Two years ago, Tallahassee wanted to make an appointed official harder to fire. City Hall said the protection had to go in the Charter. The voters got a say.
This time, the voters get no say at all.
Oh, and one more thing.
When the City Commission voted in April 2024 to move forward with the Charter amendment giving the Inspector General supermajority protection, the vote was 4-1.
The lone “no” vote?
Mayor John Dailey.
September 9, 2026
There are bad nights for a football team, and then there are bad nights for an entire city. Monday was both on a national scale. For any growing business or high school senior thinking about relocating to Tallahassee, this was the city’s one chance to make a first impression, and it blew it.[…]
September 8, 2026
Opinion by Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
There are bad nights for a football team, and then there are bad nights for an entire city. Monday was both on a national scale. For any growing business or high school senior thinking about relocating to Tallahassee, this was the city’s one chance to make a first impression, and it blew it.
With a national television audience watching, Doak Campbell Stadium lost power shortly before Florida State was supposed to kick off against SMU. The game finally began nearly two hours late, with portions of the stadium still without power. The scoreboard was dark. The public-address system wasn’t functioning. Coaches lost electronic communications and sideline technology.
Miami immediately piled on. ESPN chronicled the trolling. And Tallahassee residents heard from friends and family around the country asking some version of the same question: What in the world happened in Tallahassee?
Good question.
This was a failure of leadership
Whatever the technical explanation turns out to be, Monday night was a failure of leadership.
That doesn’t mean the mayor, city manager or FSU president was supposed to know how to repair a transformer. It means people at the top are responsible for making sure their organizations are prepared when something goes wrong — and for communicating with the public when it does.
Neither happened very well Monday night.
Tens of thousands of fans sat inside and around Doak for nearly two hours with remarkably little information. Even after the PA system returned, there was no meaningful explanation or apology from university leadership and no thank-you to the fans who stuck around. As of 9:30 Tuesday morning, there had been no apology from FSU’s top leadership and nothing meaningful from City Hall, the mayor or the city manager.
For a city and university with plenty of professional communicators, Tallahassee suddenly became remarkably shy.
And communication wasn’t the only question.
This wasn’t the first outage
Thousands of City utility customers lost power the night before the game. We don’t yet know whether that had anything to do with what happened at Doak Monday night, and it may not have.
But it raises an obvious question: After a significant outage less than 24 hours before one of the largest events Tallahassee hosts all year, did anyone make sure the electrical infrastructure serving Doak was ready? Did the City talk with FSU? Were systems checked? Was backup power available?
Maybe all of that happened. Maybe Sunday’s outage and Monday’s failure were completely unrelated. Fine. Tell us. But after the night Tallahassee just had, “these things happen” isn’t much of an answer.
About that $27 million
There is another piece of history that makes Monday night’s embarrassment almost painfully ironic.
When FSU came to local taxpayers for help with Doak Campbell Stadium in 2021, it wasn’t asking for money to make the stadium prettier. The case for the $20 million Blueprint appropriation was built around aging infrastructure and public safety.
And right there on the list were electricity and lighting.
Contemporary reporting described the needs as including the stadium’s foundation, electricity, lighting and drainage. The final list included emergency lighting and aging electrical equipment, along with safety, ADA and code-compliance work. Because Blueprint borrowed the $20 million, the ultimate cost to local taxpayers was projected at nearly $27 million.
Think about that for a moment.
Local taxpayers were asked to spend nearly $27 million, including borrowing costs, to help FSU address aging stadium infrastructure that specifically included electricity and lighting.
Four years later, on national television, the lights went out.
That doesn’t establish that Monday night’s failure involved any equipment repaired with Blueprint money. We don’t know that yet. But it certainly makes taxpayers entitled to know exactly what electrical work their money paid for, what equipment failed Monday night and whether there is any connection between the two.
The irony doesn’t end there. As FSU’s much larger $265 million renovation neared completion, the university reported about $25 million in savings. Some argued that, given the local taxpayers’ contribution, FSU should give money back. Instead, FSU received approval to expand the project and use the savings for, among other things, new Jumbotrons and video boards.
Monday night, the Jumbotrons went dark along with everything else.
Madame Sunshine already knows what happened
Fortunately, Red Tape Florida’s Madame Sunshine has peered into her crystal ball.
She sees an investigation followed by an “isolated equipment failure” or an “unforeseeable electrical event.” There are already reports floating around about a vehicle striking a transformer, so perhaps that will prove to be the culprit. And perhaps it really was.
What Madame Sunshine has more trouble seeing is anyone stepping to a microphone and saying: “This happened on our watch. It was unacceptable. We should have been better prepared. Here’s what went wrong, and here’s what we’re doing to make sure it doesn’t happen again.”
She also predicts that Sunday’s outages and Monday’s stadium failure will become completely unrelated events with remarkable speed — at least when the subject turns to responsibility.
Maybe they were unrelated. Let’s see the records.
Awards are nice. Performance is better.
There is some irony here.
Just last month, the City Commission celebrated City Manager Reese Goad receiving the E.C. Shreve Jr. Lifetime Achievement Award from the Florida Municipal Electric Association. The agenda item touted Tallahassee’s smart-grid technology, its commitment to reliable and high-quality service and its recognition as the “No. 1 Public Utility in America” and a “Utility of the Future, Today.”
Good for Goad. But this is the problem with government’s fixation on awards: people tend to remember performance more than plaques.
Monday night was about as visible a performance as Tallahassee could get: tens of thousands of people, a nationally televised football game and the eyes of the college football world on the city.
The lights went out, the game was delayed nearly two hours and the response from the people in charge was mostly silence.
That’s the kind of first impression that lingers for years.
September 8, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
If you live, work or own a business in Tallahassee, City Hall’s proposed FY2027 budget has a little something for you.
And by “something,” we mean a higher bill.
The City Commission will hold its first public hearing Wednesday on a $983.5 million budget that keeps Tallahassee’s property-tax rate unchanged. But thanks to rising property values, keeping the same rate doesn’t mean keeping the same tax collections: the City expects to collect about $4.1 million more in property taxes next year.
And property taxes are only the beginning.
Buried among the budget documents are proposed increases in residential and commercial garbage rates, water and sewer rates and monthly parking charges. Some are relatively modest. Others — particularly for businesses — are anything but.
Let’s start with garbage.
The monthly charge for standard residential curbside service would rise from $26.70 to $28.19, an increase of about 5.6 percent. That’s less than $18 a year, so nobody is going to have to sell the house over it.
Businesses may want to keep reading.
The minimum commercial garbage charge would jump from $33.43 to $40.05, an increase of nearly 20 percent. A two-yard dumpster emptied once a week goes from $59.63 to $89.54 — a 50 percent increase. The same dumpster serviced every other week goes from $29.81 to $53.81, an increase of more than 80 percent.
The increases vary depending on dumpster size and frequency, but they’re substantial across the commercial rate schedule. A three-yard dumpster picked up weekly rises about 40 percent, a four-yard dumpster about 35 percent and an eight-yard dumpster about 27 percent.
There’s also a particularly interesting sentence in the city’s explanation for why it needs more money from garbage customers.
Among the reasons cited for the increase: “The Solid Waste transfer to the General Fund has been increased.”
In other words, the City isn’t simply saying garbage costs more to collect and dump. Its own resolution says one reason Solid Waste needs additional revenue is because the amount being transferred from the utility into the City’s General Fund has increased.
That’s worth remembering the next time somebody tells you a garbage rate is just a garbage rate.
And this isn’t necessarily a one-year affair. The proposed resolution also establishes an annual adjustment tied to inflation, plus another 1 percent, beginning with future rate adjustments.
Water and sewer are going up, too
Tallahassee water and sewer customers already received a 2.4 percent inflation adjustment last October.
Under the City’s rate plan, another inflation adjustment takes effect Oct. 1. Then, beginning April 1, 2027, water rates would receive an additional 2 percent increase and wastewater rates another 3.8 percent.
Commercial customers get another surprise: commercial water gallonage charges are slated for an additional 8 percent increase in April.
And the increases don’t stop with FY2027. The City’s consultant recommends annual increases of inflation plus another 1 percent in FY2028, FY2029 and FY2030.
The City has legitimate expenses to pay. Its utility consultant points to major capital projects, increasing operating expenses, salaries and benefits among the reasons additional revenue is needed.
But once again, the General Fund makes an appearance.
The consultant’s analysis notes that future financial pressure on the water and sewer system could be addressed in part by reducing transfers from the utility to the City’s General Fund.
There’s a pattern here worth watching: utility customers pay their bills, the utility sends some of that money to the General Fund, and the City then cites the utility’s revenue needs when proposing higher rates.
Don’t forget parking
Even parking gets more expensive under the proposal.
A monthly lease at the Kleman Plaza garage would rise from $105 to $120, a 14.3 percent increase. Eastside garage parking goes from $120 to $135, up 12.5 percent.
Hourly garage rates and the $1-an-hour street-meter rate appear to remain unchanged, so this one lands primarily on people who park downtown regularly.
Taken individually, some of these increases aren’t enormous. Another $1.49 a month for residential garbage isn’t going to wreck the family budget, and $15 more for a monthly parking space isn’t going to send downtown workers into bankruptcy.
But taxpayers don’t pay City Hall one line item at a time.
They pay the property-tax bill. They pay the garbage bill. They pay the water bill. They pay the sewer bill. Businesses pay those bills, too, often at considerably higher rates. And then the cost of doing business gets passed along in the prices everybody else pays.
That’s why the entire package deserves attention at Wednesday’s budget hearing.
September 8, 2026
OK, City of Tallahassee, explain this to taxpayers like we’re stupid. Earlier this year, City Hall paid nearly $3.9 million in incentives to get 171 employees to leave. Now, just months later, the city’s proposed FY2027 budget calls for 20 more employees than it has in the current budget.[…]
September 4, 2026
By Skip Foster, Red Tape Florida
OK, City of Tallahassee, explain this to taxpayers like we’re stupid.
Earlier this year, City Hall paid nearly $3.9 million in incentives to get 171 employees to leave.
Now, just months later, the city’s proposed FY2027 budget calls for 20 more employees than it has in the current budget.
We’ll wait.
The numbers are right there in the budget documents headed to the City Commission for the first of two public hearings Wednesday. Tallahassee’s current FY2026 budget includes 3,044.75 full-time equivalent positions. The proposed FY2027 budget has 3,064.75. Go back a little further and the trend is even more striking: the city had 2,981.75 FTEs in FY2024 and 2,996.75 in FY2025. If the new budget is approved, Tallahassee City government will have grown by 83 FTEs in three years.

Ordinarily, another 20 employees might not be particularly remarkable, especially because the new positions proposed for FY2027 are police officers. But this isn’t an ordinary budget year. City Hall spent nearly $3.9 million earlier this year on its Voluntary Separation Incentive program, which persuaded 171 employees to leave. The departing workers represented about $12.15 million in annual salaries before benefits, and 28 of them were making six figures.
At the time, city officials projected the program would produce about $8.46 million in annual savings. Red Tape Florida thought that sounded like a number worth understanding, so we asked for the spreadsheet, financial model, workbook, emails, memoranda or presentations used to calculate it.
The city’s response: “No such record exists.”
That was curious enough when RTF later found that the city’s salary line wasn’t going down. It was going up, from roughly $181.5 million in FY2026 to about $187.1 million in the proposed FY2027 budget. Those are still the numbers on the “award-winning” budget portal Mayor John Dailey loves to crow about (which hasn’t been updated since June 9). Now the workforce numbers create another obvious question: if 171 employees were paid to leave as part of a cost-saving strategy, why does the budget authorize more employees than before they left?
Anybody heard of Amendment 3?
And what about the impending doom we’ve been hearing about with Amendment 3, the proposed constitutional amendment on the November ballot that the city says could cost Tallahassee approximately $29 million over the next two fiscal years?
You might expect the nearly $4 million voluntary buyout program — pitched as a way to prepare City Hall for exactly that kind of financial hit — to get some serious attention in the proposed budget. Instead, you have to hunt for it. The 171 departures aren’t mentioned. Neither is the $3.87 million cost or the projected $8.46 million in annual savings. The VSI gets little more than a couple of passing references, including one describing it as among the “prudent financial strategies” that are “critical” to preparing for Amendment 3 and another saying it supports “long-term financial planning.”
That’s a pretty modest victory lap for a program City Hall has portrayed as an important part of preparing for a potential $29 million revenue hit — particularly when the same budget proposes a workforce of 3,064.75 FTEs, 20 more than the year before the buyouts.
Biggest budget cut: Details
The budget doesn’t tell commissioners how many of the 171 positions were permanently eliminated, how many were refilled, how many remain vacant or what the recurring annual savings from the buyouts actually are. It doesn’t explain how the city arrives at $8.46 million in projected savings, and it doesn’t reconcile that claim with a salary budget and authorized workforce that are both growing.
Instead, the agenda item talks about “proactive workforce planning,” “disciplined long-term financial management” and continued efforts to “streamline operations” and “consolidate work groups.”
Those phrases sound reassuring. The numbers require a little more explanation.
Perhaps all of that can be reconciled. Authorized FTEs are not the same thing as filled jobs, salary savings can occur when highly paid employees are replaced by cheaper ones, and commissioners may have perfectly sound reasons for adding police officers while reducing costs elsewhere.
But taxpayers shouldn’t have to reverse-engineer the city’s personnel strategy from footnotes and payroll tables.
The city spent nearly $3.9 million to get 171 employees to leave. It told residents that would save roughly $8.46 million annually. It is now citing that program as a key part of its preparation for a possible $29 million property-tax hit.
And the budget it is asking commissioners to approve authorizes the largest city workforce of the last four years.
So we’ll go back to where we started.
City of Tallahassee, explain it to us like we’re stupid:
What exactly did taxpayers get for their $3.87 million — and how, exactly, is this preparing Tallahassee for Amendment 3?
September 4, 2026